We live in a ceaselessly changing and inescapably dynamic social world. Given the inherent unpredictability of human complex systems, this brief article seeks to show that agent-based social simulations can possibly approach the ideal of a fundamental law of social dynamics, including all forms or processes of social dynamics, articulated with everyday life and action, individual or collective. This ultimately tends to recover the explanatory potential of social networks and offer an efficient research basis for the creative re-conceptualization of social dynamics.
1
As Stacey, Griffin and Shaw comprehensively argue and conclude, "…no individual or group of individuals can be 'in control' of the whole system. This departs from the dominant discourse in which the only alternative to an individual being 'in control' is thought to be anarchy" (Stacey, Griffin, and Shaw 2000, 124) . The hitherto obsolete deterministic platform of cause and effect, leading to predictions, seems to be incompatible to the above theoretical framework. 2 In the early 1960s, a new analytical approach began to gain ground which, without denying the basic tenets of determinism, demonstrated that not all deterministic systems are predictable, because some of them are sensitive to initial conditions. This means that small, or even trivial, causes Interestingly, it is the predictability discourse itself that excludes free will and choice, because it sees social facts as by nature or de facto inescapable and any purposeful action as almost meaningless.
1 See the very interesting critical discussion of what Dick Pels perceptively calls "methodological voluntarism" (Pels 2000, 210-214) .
2 A quite simple mathematical analysis could easily show that, even in simple and explainable systems, which perfectly obey Newton's laws of motion, we cannot always and accurately predict what is going to happen next. This is because of a persistent instability and fluidity, as well as of an undecidable multiplicity of forces that variously affect and act upon an object. For sure, any attempt to predict a simple system's future behaviour over long times will be defeated. Of course, this does not mean that we can say nothing about the very dynamic properties and processes of the system. Although the scientific "ability to predict unpredictability" would be a very useful tool in policy making (Saperstein 1986) , unpredictability itself cannot be predicted -at least not in a traditional sense, that is, by comparing successive snapshots of a system's trajectory in time (Katerelos and Koulouris 2004a). can have disproportional (unanticipated and unforeseen) effects upon the behavior of the entire system. Such an approach was named by E. Lorenz as chaos theory (Lorenz 1963) and was widely communicated to the public by J. Gleick's best-seller Chaos: Making a New Science, nearly two decades later (Gleick 1987). 3 A chaotic system's esoteric interactions usually prevail upon external control attempts. The counter-intuitive behaviours of human complex systems generally result from often "very complicated feedback loops in the system, which cause many management mistakes and undesired side effects. Such effects are particularly well-known from failing political attempts to improve the social or economic conditions" (Helbing 2009, 428) .
As John Urry rightly observes, many small "local actions" can rapidly interact and surprisingly ramify to create "global waves" or "global fluids" (i.e. unstable networks such as travelling peoples, automobility, global brands, social and political movements, environmental and health hazards), which are seen as highly unpredictable, and as often lacking a clear starting and end point: "The 'particles' of people, information, objects, money, images, risks and networks move within and across diverse regions forming heterogeneous, uneven, unpredictable and often unplanned waves…Such waves demonstrate no clear point of departure, deterritorialised movement, at certain speeds and at different levels of viscosity with no necessary end state or purpose" (Urry 2003, 60) .
Paradoxically, chaos theory had a very limited impact on the social sciences. This was mainly due to its immanent reference to the physical world, as well as to its strong attachment to a rigid positivistic framework. Such an attachment triggered a sharp and decisive division between the interdisciplinary hybrid science of chaos and the realm of social science (or social research). The latter has totally rejected the mechanistic, naturalistic or organicistic connotations of "chaos" and its theoretical and methodological applications to culture and society (Kiel and Elliot 1997) .
Since the 1970s, chaos theory has been variously introduced and developed within the wider field of humanities to serve the discourses of post-modernism, post-structuralism, social constructivism, aesthetics, and so on. Nevertheless, this development, mostly articulated in an insular "fuzzy" fashion, has been followed by inappropriate idioms, the diminishment or disappearance of the qualitative or material dimension, and the eventual misunderstanding of what chaos theory really means (Smith and Jenks 2006) .
Even after the 1990s, when computing technology was widely diffused and computational social models were rendered highly accessible to most scholars, social research (albeit computer-aided) continued to orient itself to a constructionist mode. Social reality was then "moved to the suburbs" once again -and this time definitely. Hence, fundamentality in the social sciences has been largely abandoned and often perceived as chimerical, given the cultural and value diversity evidenced in contemporary societies throughout the world.
In general, the advent of social simulations, as a new methodological perspective, initially attempted to re-establish the famous connection between micro and macro elements, or between lived social reality and social facts, as pursued by Emile Durkheim in the late nineteenth century (Durkheim 1951 ). Axelrod comprehensively describes social simulations as a wholly new approach for social sciences and, beyond that, as a third way of doing science (Axelrod 1997) . Radically different from induction or deduction, social simulations have the high ambition of presenting a new kind of thinking and, consecutively, new and surprising findings (Friedkin 1998; Epstein and Axtell 1996) . This novel kind, of course, conveys strong positivistic features -namely, objectivism (subject/object distinction), value freedom (facts/values distinction), instrumentalism, and technicism (Gilbert and Doran 1993; Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005) . But it also bears a negative positivistic weight -that is, major disadvantages mostly pertaining to the same context. The latter involves a lack of empirical data or, more broadly, a total lack of experiential basis, either in a phenomenalistic sense or in a mere physicalistic way.
This entails that social simulations (as social research methodology) are tightly linked to positivism but, at the same time, a strong abstraction (a "modelization") is necessarily needed to make a direct reference to another social world: a world seen as full of intentions, sentiments, motives, In such an analytical viewpoint, the social simulation researcher is representing her/his socially shared conception of the social world by modelizing and simulating it (Tsekeris 2009 ).
-according to the rationale of hermeneutics, phenomenology, cultural studies, etc.
5
What is therefore needed here is to employ a social simulation model based on simplicity and emergence. That is, fundamentality can solely be accessed in a bottom-up way and complexity must result as a research finding. This comes in direct contrast to a top-down procedure, which would inevitably pre-suppose emerging complexity as a starting point, finally leading to a circular argument -a reflexive duplication, or a vicious analytical circle (Pels 2000) .
Thus, the researcher is subject to certain social variables, factors and influences, or even infected by a "fluid" and "inter-subjective" social reality consisting of the messy contents of human interaction, including rationalizations, values, norms, ethical principles and moral judgments.
Existing simulation models do not seem to actually correspond to the above analytical framework; either they go from "simple" rules to an emerging yet equally "simple" end, mostly yielding social equilibrium (simplicity in, simplicity out) (Gilbert 2008 ), or they move from "complex" rules (introducing complexity) to an emerging "complex" outcome, in a rather anticipated way (complexity in, complexity out) (e.g. Flache and Torenvlied 2004) .
This kind of dualism is counter-productive and persistent in all social simulation modeling, perhaps with the exception of an agent-based simulation model called MER model (Katerelos and Koulouris 2004a; 2004b) . According to the MER model, all social agents have to comply with two simple rules: (a) each agent seeks to reach social consensus (by adopting the mean of his/her surrounding opinions) and (b) each agent attempts to attain internal consistency corresponding to a stabilized internal cognitive state (by maintaining the opinion which sustained the major social change and abstracting this change from the counter-opinion).
6
A system in complete (or absolute) equilibrium cannot possibly give any information about its internal functions or mechanisms: if there are absolutely no changes occurring, then nothing would serve as a trigger to study the regularities that govern it. So, systemic equilibrium almost amounts to complete methodological blindness. It now makes sense that a "stable system" is neither a feasible nor a desirable condition, since a predictable, motionless and inert social system does not exhibit any characteristics of adaptation, creativity or innovation; it is therefore doomed to die (or dissolute). This would probably be "a very hopeless, colourless, periodical, monotonous, dull and boring world: A completely grey social universe (against human nature itself)" (Tsekeris 2010, 39 ).
Yet, high instability (or high entropy) is an equally undesirable condition, since the system cannot adequately evaluate or integrate, or even digest, the continuous flow of change and innovation. The reason is that a very unstable social system does not have the necessary time of transforming innovation to adaptation. Such a system is rather condemned to explode because localities will sooner or later tend to autonomize -perhaps, cutting ties purposefully. This possibly leads to a structural segmentation aimed at local stabilization, since an overall stabilization is completely impossible.
Hence, contrary to the traditional or received criticism against social network theoretical approach as "mere descriptive" (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, and Labianca 2009) , agent-based simulation modeling can fruitfully use social networks as a causal factor shaping social dynamics. In other words, social networks may indeed involve causal inference and not "just methodology". Last but not least, social theorists and researchers ought to maintain a critical explanatory view on the ongoing dialectic of bottom-up and top-down emergence in contemporary complex social systems (Fuchs and Hofkirchner 2005) .
